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Abstract 
This study draws on the corporate governance literature to identify the important factor that underlies the stock 
price formation process and to explain cross-sectional difference in the extent to which future earnings 
information is capitalized in current stock returns. We examine the effect of stock ownership structure (i.e., 
divergence level of cash flow rights and voting rights) on the extent to which stock prices lead accounting 
earnings in nine East Asian economies: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines. We find that stock returns of firms with larger divergence between cash 
flow rights and voting rights incorporate future earnings news earlier than firms with smaller divergence between 
cash flow rights and voting rights. The results are robust to the control of size, past growth, loss, and the sign of 
current returns. Our results indicate the importance of ownership structure in explaining the cross-sectional 
variation in price informativeness about future earnings. 
Keywords: Price-Leading-Earnings, Ownership Structure, East Asian Economies, Divergence between Cash 
Flow Rights and Voting Rights 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent research on value relevance of accounting earnings and earnings components in East Asian economies 
essentially adopts a view that earnings information is primarily reflected in stock returns 
contemporaneously(e.g., Fan and Wong, 2002). This view probably stems from the extant findings based on U.S. 
firms. However ownership structure in the U.S. is distinctively different from that of East Asian firms. 
Compared to their U.S. and U.K. counterparts, corporate ownership in East Asian firms is highly concentrated 
(La Porta et al., 1998). This highly concentrated ownership structure may cause stock prices to incorporate 
earnings information early. Consequently, the use of a contemporaneous association specification to test the 
value relevance of earnings information will need to be revaluated. 
The objective of this study is to investigate the effect of stock ownership structure (i.e., divergence level 
between cash flow rights and voting rights) on the extent to which stock prices lead accounting earnings in nine 
East Asian economies: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and 
the Philippines. Price-leading-eamings effect refers to the phenomenon that stock prices incorporate future 
earnings before they are released through financial statements. Price-leading-eamings effect has been a focus of 
earlier accounting studies in understanding the lower-than-expected contemporaneous association between stock 
returns and accounting earnings (Collins et al. 1994; Durnev et al., 2003; Kothari and Sloan, 1992; Warfield and 
Wild, 1992). Price-leading-earnings is an important issue because the informativeness of stock prices about 
future earnings implies the extent to which value-relevance information about a firm’s prospects is available to 
investors and it incorporated in stock price (Haw et al, 2012) .This study provides new evidence on how 
corporate ownership structure in East Asian economies affects the extent to which prices lead accounting 
earnings. 
Corporate share ownership can be viewed as a property rights arrangement through which the owner of 
the share is entitled to three types of rights (. First, the owner has the decision right of deploying corporate assets, 
i.e., the control or voting rights. Second, the owner has the right to earn income, i.e., the cash flow rights. And 
third, the owner has the right to transfer the share and the associated control and cash flow rights to another party 
(e.g., Fan and Wong, 2002). In this perspective, the value of share depends on how well its property rights are 
enforced. Since the enforcement of property rights is usually undertaken by both individual and the state, 
concentrated ownership will be observed in economies where property rights are not well enforced by the state 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999). Therefore, the private enforcement of property rights is a 
probable reason for the concentrated ownership of East Asian corporations, which often confront weak legal 
systems, poor law enforcement, and corruption (Fan and Wong, 2002; Fan et al., 2010). 
Corporate ownership in East Asia is highly concentrated, especially in a small number of influential 
families. And the controlling owners frequently possess less cash flow rights than voting rights because the 
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controlling owners can enhance their voting rights by pyramid structure or cross-holdings. Furthermore, top 
managers often come from the controlling families (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000). The concentration of 
ownership in controlling owners, their close ties to firm managers, and large divergence between cash flow 
rights and voting rights provide the controlling shareholders both incentives and abilities to acquire 'private' 
information about firms' operating, investing, and financing activities much sooner than the release of the 
financial statements. The demand for and resultant early acquisition of private management information suggest 
that stock prices can incorporate accounting information relatively early. The demand for private management 
information likely arises from the need of controlling shareholders to maximize their wealth by prompting the 
timely execution of strategic activities. Firms often have to undertake investments in either fixed assets or 
intangible assets on a timeliness basis since investment opportunities cannot be stored. But the benefits of these 
investments only slowly flow through accounting earnings after satisfying accounting recognition and 
measurement criteria, resulting in prices incorporating earnings information relatively early. 
Alternatively, the concentration of ownership and the divergence between ultimate controlling 
shareholder's cash flow rights and voting rights may create an incentive for the ultimate controlling shareholders 
to expropriate minority shareholders. Expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders through 
pursuing pet investment projects and engaging in side-deals or insider trading creates the demand for private 
information on firms' investment opportunities prior to the disclosure of such information in financial statements. 
The perverse incentives arising from concentrated stock ownership will lead to stock prices capturing the private 
management information earlier than public disclosure of accounting earnings. Therefore, it is hypothesized that 
price-leading-eamings effect increases with the degree of divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights. 
East Asian economies provide an ideal setting to test this hypothesis because prior research (e.g., Claessens, 
Djankov, and Lang, 2000; La Porta et al., 1999;La Porta et al., 2002) has shown that there is considerable 
divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights in East Asian economies. 
Using a sample of 5,519 firm-year observations in nine East Asian countries from 1990 to 1994, we 
perform different analyses to test the relation between firm-level ownership structure and the extent of price-
lead-earnings. Empirical results reported in this study are consistent with our hypothesis. As expected, the 
sample firms exhibit highly concentrated ownership structure. More importantly, voting rights always exceed 
cash flow rights, especially in Japan, Indonesia, and Singapore. Consistent with Fan and Wong's (2002) findings, 
the informativeness of current earnings is negatively associated with the degree of divergence between cash flow 
rights and voting rights. However, stock returns of firms with higher level of divergence between cash flow 
rights and voting rights reflect future earnings much earlier than firms with lower level of such divergence. The 
effect of cash-vote divergence on price-leading-eamings is robust to the controls of firm size, past growth, loss, 
and the sign of current returns. Although observations in Japan account for approximately 70% of the full sample, 
the results remain similar when observations from Japan are excluded. 
The effects of controlling shareholders' concentrated ownership and the cash-vote divergence on the 
extent of prices-leading-earnings effect in East Asia are fundamentally different from those in the U.S. or U.K., 
where the ownership structure of public enterprises is typically diverse and diffuse. A large number of small 
investors have little incentives or resources to acquire private management information when faced with the 
classic free-rider problem. Instead, they rely on disclosed financial statements as the main source of information 
about company performance. Further, stringent insider trading regulations mitigate managers' incentives to 
exploit minority shareholders' information disadvantage, further rendering financial statements as the major 
source of information on firm performance (Burgstahler et al, 2006; Leuz et al., 2003). Additionally, 
shareholders and creditors tend to operate at greater arms' length from managers, hence reducing the potential of 
stock prices incorporating earnings information early. 
Our study contributes to the ongoing debates on the value relevance and quality of accounting 
information by providing new evidence on the effect of ownership structure on the extent to which prices lead 
accounting earnings. Extant literature remains relatively silent on this important question. Fan and Wong's study 
(2002) is perhaps most closely related to this study in that they examine the relations between earnings 
informativeness and the ownership structure of 977 companies in seven East Asian economies. However, Fan 
and Wong's study (2002) is incomplete in the sense that they only consider the contemporaneous price-earnings 
relation but ignore the stock returns could also reflect information other than current earnings. This study extends 
Fan and Wong's study (2002) by examining how ownership structure affects the relation between current returns 
and future earnings, in addition to contemporaneous price-earnings relation, in East Asian economies. Our study 
finds that stock returns of firms with the higher level of divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights 
reflect future earnings much earlier than firms with the lower level of such divergence. These findings indicate 
that market's anticipation of future earnings changes is most likely to be the important reason why the 
association between stock returns and earnings is weaker than predictions from theory in East Asia economies. 
In addition, our study adds to the growing body of literature on corporate governance and transparency. Our 
evidences reveal that ownership structure is an importance factor to influence company’s disclosure policy and 
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corresponding the transparency of information in weak institution environment. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews prior research and develops the 
hypothesis. Sample selection process and data are described in Section 3. Section 4 presents main regression 
results for testing the hypothesis. Additional analyses are reported in Section 5. Section 6 makes a conclusion. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis development 
2.1 Literature review on ownership structure, earnings informativeness, and price-lead-earnings 
Much of the literature on the role and functioning of the modem corporations is based on the assumption of 
widely dispersed ownership. This notion originally derives from Berle and Means (1932) and has been 
propagated by Baumol (1959), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Grossman and Hart (1980). However, recent 
research on this line shows that some concentration of ownership does exist (La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et 
al., 1999; Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000). Furthermore, the level of ownership concentration in some 
developed and most of the developing countries is even higher (La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 1999). For 
example, La Porta el al. (1998) show that the mean of ownership by the three largest shareholders is: Hong Kong 
0.54, Indonesia 0.58, Japan 0.18, Malaysia 0.54, Singapore 0.49, South Korea 0.23, Taiwan 0.18, Thailand 0.47 
and the Philippines 0.57, indicating the high ownership concentration in East Asian. To evaluate the potential 
agency problems between ultimate owners and minority shareholders, La Porta et al. (1999) and  Claessens, 
Djankov and Lang (2000) examine whether the cash flow rights of the ultimate shareholders are substantially 
different from their voting rights. They show that control of East Asian corporations can be achieved with 
significantly less than an absolute majority share of the stock, as the probability of being a single controlling 
owner through holding only 20% of the stock is very high (above 80% across the four East Asian economies). 
This indicates the existence of separation of cash flow rights from control rights across the East Asian economies 
(Note 1). One example is Li Ka-Shing family conglomerate. For example, Li Ka-Shing family conglomerate 
consists of 25 companies. Hong Kong Electric，s ultimate owner is Li Ka-Shing family, which controls 34% of 
the vote with 2.5% of the cash flow rights. They use this to follow the ownership chain of Li Ka-Shing: Cheung 
Kong & Hutchision Whampoa & Cavendish International & Hong Kong Electric, where the weakest link in the 
chain is 34% control of Hong Kong Electric by Cavendish International. This example illustrates that there is a 
clear separation of cash flow rights from voting rights, especially among family-controlled firms and small firms. 
Claessens et al. (2000) also find top management of about 60% of not-widely-held firms is related to the 
controlling shareholder family. These findings have important implications for the abilities and incentives of 
controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders and get private benefits through control rights. In 
sum, ownership in East Asian firms is highly concentrated and there is substantial divergence between cash flow 
rights and voting rights, while manager-owner conflicts are generally limited. The agency problems in 
concentrated ownership are the interest conflicts between major shareholders and minority shareholders. 
Financial reporting and market regulatory systems in emerging markets are relatively primitive and 
incomplete compared to mature markets (Xiang, 1998). Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) study the effect of 
international institutional factors on properties of accounting earnings. Ball, Robin and Wu (2002) hypothesize 
that the quality of reported financial information depends on the incentives faced by managers and auditors when 
preparing financial statements, in addition to the accounting standards under which they are prepared. Their 
results suggest that information quality is primarily determined by the underlying economic and political factors 
influencing managers and auditors' incentives, rather than by accounting standards. They further argue that 
perhaps the most salient institutional feature of these Asian economies that influences earning quality is the 
dominance of family ownership in these economies. This reduces the demand for transparency and quality of 
reported earnings and other accounting information. Several studies also indicate that ownership structure affects 
the informativeness of accounting earnings. Warfield et al. (1995) hypothesize that the level of managerial 
ownership affects both the informativenss of earnings and the magnitude of discretionary accounting accrual 
adjustments. They show that managerial ownership is positively associated with earnings' explanatory power for 
stock returns. El-Gazzar (1998) finds that the higher the institutional ownership, the lower the market reaction to 
earnings releases, after controlling for firms' market capitalization and the number of analysts following. This 
finding suggests that firms' ownership composition is an important determinant of the market's reaction to 
earnings releases. Fan and Wong (2002) used the theories of entrenchment effect, alignment effect and 
information effects to develop their hypothesis that for a given level of voting rights, an increase in the 
divergence between the controlling owner's degree of cash flow rights and voting rights decreases the 
informativeness of the firm's earnings. They find that the relationship between earnings and stock prices is 
negatively related to the ultimate owner's voting rights, as well as the degree of divergence between the ultimate 
owner's cash flow rights and voting rights.  
Price informativeness (price-lead-earnings) is also an important aspect of information transparency for 
shareholders and investors (Note 2).  The extent of price lead earnings dependent on firm characteristics, 
including firm size (Collins, Kothari, and Raybum, 1987; Freeman, 1987; Ayers and Freeman, 2000), 
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institutional ownership (Rajgopal et al. ,2002) (Note 3), analyst following (Ayers and Freeman ,2001), disclosure 
activity (Lundholm and Myers, 2002). In an international context, Ali and Hwang (2000) note that the 
association between stock returns and earnings is affected by intercountry differences, including bank-oriented 
versus market-oriented financial systems, government versus private accounting standard setters, British-
American versus Continental accounting clusters, financial-tax alignment, and spending on auditing services. 
Haw et al. (2012) find that greater financial disclosure, higher quality earnings, and greater information 
dissemination through news media are associated with stock prices that are more informative about future 
earnings. Our study extends this line of research by investigate the association between firm-level ownership 
structure and price-lead-earning effects. 
 
2.2 Hypothesis development 
Most research on value relevance of accounting earnings and earnings components in East Asian economies 
adopts a view that earnings information is primarily reflected in stock returns contemporaneously. This view 
stems likely from the findings of existing literature on U.S. firms, and, to a less extent, U.K. firms, where firms' 
ownership structure is distinctively different from that of East Asian firms. To the extent that diffuse stock 
ownership of U.S. firms and increased arm's length transactions between managers and stakeholders of the firms 
reduce the potential for stock prices to incorporate earnings information early, using a contemporaneous 
association specification to test for the value relevance of earnings information can be justifiable. In light of the 
salient features in ownership structures in East Asian firms, however, the maintained assumption underlying a 
contemporaneous retum-eamings association specification need to be put into empirical tests. 
The ownership of listed companies in East Asian economies is typically concentrated in the hands of 
large shareholders. The degree of ownership concentration affects the nature of contracting, creating agency 
problems between managers and outsides: the nature of the agency problems shifts away from manager-
shareholder conflicts to conflicts between the controlling owner and minority shareholders. Once controlling 
owners achieve effective control, their ownership concentration has two incentive effects: entrenchment effect 
and alignment effect. When there is no separation between cash flow rights and voting rights, concentrating 
ownership beyond the minimum level for effective control enhances the alignment of interest and hence 
mitigates the entrenchment effect. But there is divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights, the 
controlling owners becomes entrenched with high level of control, while the low equity ownership level provides 
a low degree of alignment between the controlling owner and minority shareholder, which indicates that lower 
cash flow rights may fail to provide sufficient incentive alignment to curtail the entrenchment effect. Therefore, 
entrenchment effect dominates when cash flow rights and voting rights diverge. In this study divergence between 
cash flow rights and voting rights is proxied for the ownership structure. 
In East Asian economies, concentrated control is achieved through stock pyramids and cross-
shareholdings, which create a separation in cash flow rights and voting rights. And mangers in these firms 
always have close relation to large shareholding or are numbers of large shareholders families. Large 
shareholders have value-maximizing incentive and entrenchment incentive to search for private information. 
And ultimate owners have property rights to make decisions, earn income, and transfer shares to another party. 
Hence, ultimate owners have strong incentives to search for private information. Possibly, managers are always 
reluctant to provide private information to ultimate owners. Such private information can flow into stock prices 
(Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000). 
To the extent that controlling shareholders have incentives and capacity to access private information 
from corporate managers and that the divergence of cash flow rights and voting rights heightens such incentives, 
stock prices of firms that are controlled by these shareholders likely capture information in accounting earnings 
much sooner than the disclosure of financial statements, compared to stock prices of firms without such 
dominant controlling shareholders in place. Therefore, concentrated ownership structure in East Asian firms 
facilitates early acquisition of private management information, in result that stock prices reflect earnings 
information relatively earlier than the release of financial statements. The hypothesis of this study, in its 
alternative form, is stated as: 
Hypothesis: The price-leading-eamings effect increases with the degree of divergence between ultimate 
owners' cash flow rights and voting rights. 
 
3. Sample, data, and definitions of variables 
3.1 Data and sample 
The sample firms come from nine East Asian economies: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines. We only include sample firms that have sufficient 
ownership structure data (i.e., cash flow rights and voting rights), stock returns, net income and other financial 
data for empirical analysis. The data sources and sample selection process are described in Table 1. We collect 
stock returns and financial statement data from the Worldscope 2000 database. Sample firm-years should have 
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data available for annual earnings in year t-1, through t+3, market value of equity at the beginning of the year t, 
annual stock returns over the period from t to t+3. To mitigate the undue influence of outliers on regression 
estimates, we delete observations lying in the top or bottom percentile for the yearly distribution of lag earnings, 
current earnings, current return, future earnings, or future returns. 
 
Table 1. Sample selection process 
Sample selection process No. of firm-year 
Obs. deleted 
No. of firm-year 
obs. Remaining 
Initial sample with financial data from 1990 to 1994 
available from Worldscope database for nine East Asia 
countries. 
 11,679 
After deleting observations with missing Sedol No. (1,170) 10,509 
After deleting observations with missing ownership data (4,634) 5,875 
After deleting observations without requisite data on 
control variables and extreme 2% value 
(356) 5,519 
 
In this study, we focus on ultimate ownership structure. An ultimate owner is defined as the shareholder who has 
the determining voting rights of the company and who is not controlled by anybody else. If a company does not 
have an ultimate owner, it is classified as widely held. We obtain the data on the ultimate shareholders, their 
levels of voting rights, and the extent of divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights from two sources. 
We first use the Worldscope 2000 database to identify the names and immediate holdings of all owners that hold 
at least 5% of a company's outstanding shares. However, in data collection process, we find that there are too 
many missing values on ownership data in Worldscope 2000. To avoid losing too many observations, we further 
collect ownership data for these observations from Asian Company Handbook published in 1998. Since 
ownership data in Asian Company Handbook typically lag the fiscal year end by two years, the Asian Company 
Handbook data closest to our sample period is thus 1996. In order to keep the cross-sectional structure of the 
ownership data, we also collect the ownership structure data from the Worldscope as of the end of 1996 fiscal 
year or the closest possible date. Finally, we obtain cash flow rights and voting rights data for 2,980 firms. While 
ownership structure data is relatively stable over time, the inconsistency between the ownership data and the 
financial statement data would nevertheless cause measurement error problem and thus lower the power of the 
tests. Therefore, the impact of ownership structure on price-leading-eamings effect would probably be even 
stronger than the results reported below. 
To eliminate the Asia Crisis influence on the empirical tests, the sample excludes observations after 
1994，since both lagged earnings and three-year-ahead stock returns 
and earnings data are used to examine the price-leading-eamings effect. And pre-1990 data is also 
excluded because the ownership structures earlier than 1990 may differ much from the structures documented in 
1996. Therefore, the sample period is from 1990 to 1994. Finally, there are 5,519 firm-years in the final sample. 
But the number of observations in Japan is 3,904, or approximately 70% of the full sample. So we further 
examine whether the overall results are driven by Japanese firms in sensitivity tests. 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for main variables 
  Mean Std. Min 25% Median 75% Max 
Rit 0.014  0.370  -0.577  -0.217  -0.053  0.146  2.168  
Eit-1 0.031  0.038  -0.184  0.015  0.026  0.044  0.196  
Eit 0.031  0.046  -0.201  0.011  0.024  0.044  0.264  
E3it 0.097  0.193  -0.658  0.017  0.061  0.136  1.274  
R3it 0.024  0.554  -0.864  -0.313  -0.093  0.202  3.582  
V 15.304  12.375  0 5 10 22 58 
C 11.191  12.100  0 2 5 18 58 
C/V 0.662  0.352  0 0.300  0.760  1 1 
OWNit 0.338  0.352  0 0 0.240  0.670  1 
 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for main variables used in the regression tests. The full sample 
includes 5519 observations, spanning from 1990 to 1994 and covering firms from Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines. Current returns (Rit) for year t are the 
annual returns for the 12-month period during the fiscal year. Lagged earnings (Eit-1) are net income for year t-1, 
scaled by market value at the end of year t-1. Current earnings (Eit) are net income for year t, scaled by market 
value at the end of year t-1. Future earnings (E3it) are the sum of net income for the three years following the 
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current year (i.e. for years t+1, t+2 and t+3), scaled by market value at the end of year t-1. Future returns (R3it) 
are the buy-and-hold returns for the three-year period following the current year. Voting rights (V) are voting 
rights level of the largest ultimate owner of firm i. C/V ratio is the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights of 
the largest ultimate owner of firm i. Ownership structure (OWNit) is 1 minus the ratio of cash flow rights over 
voting rights of the largest ultimate owner of firm i. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the pooled financial and ownership data. The mean (median) 
value of annual stock returns is 1.4% (-5.3%). And the mean (median) of current earnings scaled by market value 
is 3.1% (2.6%). The mean (median) of future earnings and future returns are 9.7% (6.1%) and 2.4% (-9.3%), 
respectively. The variable of OWNit, i.e., (1-cash flow rights/voting right), measures the degree of divergence 
between cash flow rights and voting rights. A value close to one of this variable indicates that cash flow rights 
are divergent from voting rights. Since the mean (median) of this variable is 0.338 (0.24)，the data reveal that 
controlling owners frequently possess less cash flow rights than voting control rights in the nine East Asian 
economies examined in this study. 
Table 3 presents summary statistics (only mean and median) of the variables by country. Although the 
overall concentration of ownership is high for the economies examined, there is considerable variation in this 
variable among these economies. With a mean value of 10.234 for voting rights, Japanese firms are characterized 
by widely-held ownership structure. On the other extreme, the mean value of voting rights for Thailand firms is 
37.778, suggesting firms in Thailand are highly concentrated. The distribution of the degree of concentration of 
ownership structure is generally consistent with prior studies (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002).  
Table 3 also reports the mean value of  
  
Table 3. Mean (Median) of main variables by each country 
  Obs. Rit Eit-1 Eit E3it R3it V C C/V OWNit 
Taiwan 53 0.137  0.046  0.051  0.145  0.011  23.491  19.981  0.824  0.176  
    （0.067） （0.041） （0.04） （0.128） (-0.036) （22） （16） （1） （0） 
South Korea 373 0.141  0.048  0.056  0.138  0.006  19.477  16.059  0.862  0.138  
    （0.066） （0.047） （0.049） （0.143） (-0.144) （17） （13） （1） （0） 
Thailand 91 0.193  0.059  0.072  0.256  -0.298  37.778  35.531  0.945  0.055  
    （0.051） （0.06） （0.072） （0.218） (-0.513) （40） （36） （1） （0） 
Hong Kong 346 0.269  0.089  0.107  0.427  0.506  29.902  25.494  0.865  0.135  
    （0.22） （0.09） （0.102） （0.372） （0.342） （26） （26） （1） （0） 
Indonesia 100 0.310  0.073  0.084  0.324  0.004  36.503  27.560  0.760  0.240  
    (0.132) (0.067) (0.074) (0.263) (-0.241) (35) (26) （0.818） （0.182） 
Philippines 48 0.335  0.056  0.063  0.282  0.009  23.813  21.083  0.882  0.118  
    (0.169) (0.050) (0.056) (0.209) (-0.152) （23) （21） （1） （0） 
Malaysia 291 0.284  0.045  0.055  0.256  0.610  31.540  26.595  0.855  0.145  
    （0.132） （0.045） （0.052） （0.223） （0.533） （32） （24） （1） （0） 
Singapore 156 0.182  0.044  0.052  0.202  0.357  26.332  18.764  0.707  0.293  
    (0.058) (0.041） （0.049） （0.178） （0.111） （24） （18） （0.727） （0.273） 
Subsample 1787 0.277  0.060  0.073  0.279  0.328  27.800  22.828  0.829  0.171  
    (0.129) (0.053) (0.063) (0.226) (0.088) (26) (22) (1) (0) 
Japan 3904 -0.072  0.020  0.015  0.032  -0.079  10.234  6.476  0.593  0.407  
    (-0.098) (0.022) (0.018) (0.041) (-0.126) (10) (4) (0.6) (0.4) 
 
This table presents the mean (median) of main variables for nine East Asian countries. Current returns (Rit) for 
year t are the annual returns for the 12-month period during the fiscal year. Lagged earnings (Eit-1) are net 
income for year t-1, scaled by market value at the end of year t-1. Current earnings (Eit) are net income for year t, 
scaled by market value at the end of year t-1. Future earnings (E3it) are the sum of net income for the three years 
following the current year (i.e. for years t+1, t+2 and t+3), scaled by market value at the end of year t-1. Future 
returns (R3it) are the buy-and-hold returns for the three-year period following the current year. Voting rights (V) 
are voting rights level of the largest ultimate owner of firm i. C/V ratio is the ratio of cash flow rights over voting 
rights of the largest ultimate owner of firm i. Ownership structure (OWNit) is 1 minus the ratio of cash flow 
rights over voting rights of the largest ultimate owner of firm i. 
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Table 4. Correlation table 
  Rit Eit-1 Eit E3it R3it V C C/V OWNit 
Rit   0.243  0.349  0.419  0.006  0.191  0.209  0.118  -0.118  
    (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) -0.6374 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Eit-1 0.230    0.754  0.553  0.203  0.306  0.313  0.159  -0.159  
  (0.0001)   (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Eit 0.370  0.709    0.690  0.142  0.362  0.368  0.186  -0.186  
  (0.0001) (0.0001)   (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
E3it 0.420  0.513  0.648    0.371  0.369  0.371  0.180  -0.180  
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)   (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
R3it 0.027  0.207  0.194  0.442    0.113  0.113  0.043  -0.043  
  (0.046) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)   (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
V 0.235  0.313  0.358  0.367  0.189    0.815  0.172  -0.172  
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)   (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
C 0.227  0.308  0.351  0.353  0.179  0.907    0.657  -0.657  
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)   (0.0001) (0.0001) 
C/V 0.123  0.156  0.177  0.174  0.083  0.242  0.532    -1.000  
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)   (0.0001) 
OWNit -0.123  -0.156  -0.177  -0.174  -0.083  -0.242  -0.532  -1.000    
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)   
 
This table presents the correlation matrix including Pearson correlation (Lower table) and Spearman correlation 
(Upper table). Current returns (Rit) for year t are the annual returns for the 12-month period during the fiscal 
year. Lagged earnings (Eit-1) are net income for year t-1, scaled by market value at the end of year t-1. Current 
earnings (Eit) are net income for year t, scaled by market value at the end of year t-1. Future earnings (E3it) are 
the sum of net income for the three years following the current year (i.e. for years t+1, t+2 and t+3), scaled by 
market value at the end of year t-1. Future returns (R3it) are the buy-and-hold returns for the three-year period 
following the current year. Voting rights (V) are voting rights level of the largest ultimate owner of firm i. C/V 
ratio is the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights of the largest ultimate owner of firm i. Ownership structure 
(OWNit) is 1 minus the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights of the largest ultimate owner of firm i OWNit, 
which measures the level of the divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights. This variable ranges from 
0.055 (Thailand) to 0.407 (Japan). Since observations in Japan consist of the majority of the full sample, we also 
report the statistics for countries excluding Japan in the row of "Subsample" in Table 3. A comparison between 
subsample and Japan indicate that Japanese firms are different from firms in other economies for most of the 
variables. For example, the mean of current and future return for subsample firms is 27.7% and 32.8%, 
respectively. In contrast, stocks of Japanese firms earn negative returns during the sample period. Similarly, 
subsample firms also outperform Japanese sample firms in accounting earnings. Clearly, Japan could influence 
the overall results since Japanese firms account for more than 70% of the full sample and these firms are 
substantially different from other firms in both ownership structure and financial data. Therefore, we perform 
sensitivity tests to check whether the empirical results are robust to the exclusion of observations in Japan. The 
regression results based on the sample without Japanese firms are showed in Table 9 and we discuss the results 
in the Section 5. 
Table 4 presents Pearson and Spearman correlation matrix for variables. As expected, current returns 
are significantly correlated with current earnings and future earnings. Consistent with Collins et al. (1994), future 
returns is significantly correlated with future earnings but unrelated to current earnings. Collins et al. (1994) 
provide the economic rationale for using eaming-to-price ratio, growth in investment, and future returns as 
proxies for the measurement errors in their equation. They argue that in using realized future earnings growth to 
explain returns in period t, the measurement error that is generated by event occurring in these future periods 
affects future earnings, but not anticipated at the end of period t. In an efficient market, these events will be 
reflected in future returns. If the unanticipated events lead to increased cash flows, the measurement error and 
future earnings will be higher and future returns will also be commensurately higher. As predicted, the 
divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights is significantly and negatively correlated to current 
earnings (Eit) and future earnings (E3it). 
 
3.3 Research design 
To test the hypothesis that ownership structure affects the extent to which price leads earnings, we conduct tests 
in the following orders. 
First, we perform the regression to examine the contemporaneous association between stock returns and 
accounting earnings in East Asian economies: 
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Rit = ao+a1Eit-i+a2Eit+ (Fixed effects) + Uit,                        (1) 
Where Rit is the raw annual returns for year t.  Et-i is measured as net income in year t-1deflated by 
market value of equity at the end of year t-1. Eit is current earnings, defined as net income in year t, deflated by 
market value of equity at the end of year t-1. We also include economy and year dummy variables to control for 
fixed effects of economies and year. Economy dummy benchmark is Taiwan and year dummy benchmark is 
1994. 
In the above equation (1), both lagged and current earnings are regressed on current returns. Without 
restricting the coefficients on lagged and current earnings to be the same, this approach is superior to the 
earnings change specification. If the magnitude of the coefficient on lagged earnings is similar to that on current 
earnings but in an opposite sign, then the time-series of earnings is perceived to be a random walk process by the 
market. A coefficient on lagged earnings that is close to zero would indicate that the market treats earnings time-
series as a white noise process. In addition, including lagged earnings as an independent variable also facilitates 
controlling for possible delayed price reaction to earnings information in the prior year. 
Fan and Wong (2002) show that the information content of current earnings decreases with the degree 
of divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights in seven East Asian economies. To confirm Fan and 
Wong's findings (2002) and validate our sample observations, we include an interaction term between current 
earnings and ownership structure in the following regression: 
Rit = ao+a1Eit+a2OWNit+a3OWNit*Eit+ (Fixed effects) + Uit,            (2) 
Where, OWNit is ownership structure, defined as the divergence between cash flow rights and voting 
rights, (1-C/V). Here, C and V are the cash flow rights and voting rights of the ultimate owners, respectively. 
And all other variables are defined as above. A negative coefficient on the interaction term between OWNit and 
Eit would be consistent with Fan and Wong's study (2002).That is, concentrated ownership structure would lower 
the informativeness of accounting earnings with respect to contemporaneous stock returns. 
The above two regressions focus on the contemporaneous association between stock returns and 
accounting earnings. This is incomplete since prices could lead earnings. Following Collins et al. (1994), we first 
regress current stock returns on both current earnings and future earnings to examine price-leading-eamings 
effect in East 
Asian economies: 
Rit =bo+b1Eit-1+b2Eit+b3E3it+b4R3it+ (Fixed effects) +Uit,         (3) 
Where E3it is the sum of net income for the three years following year t, all deflated by market value of 
equity at the end of year t-1, R3it is the buy-and-hold returns for the three-year period following year t, and all 
other variables are defined as before. In the above equation (3), future earnings are defined as three-year-ahead 
earnings since prior research (e.g., Collins et al, 1994) suggests that including earnings beyond year t+3 does not 
add explanatory power. To facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients on future earnings variables, we 
aggregate earnings in year t+1 through t+3 into a single variable. And stock returns during the period between 
t+1 and t+3 are included in the regression to lower the measurement errors associated with unexpected earnings. 
A positive coefficient on E3it would suggest that the investors have anticipated part of future earnings. And the 
coefficient on R3it is expected to be negative since unanticipated events that lead to increased cash flows will be 
reflected in future returns. A negative sign ensures that irrelevant components positively related to future returns 
are removed from future earnings growth, leaving a better approximation to the changes n expectations of future 
earnings growth that occurred in period t (Collins et al, 1994). 
Next, we use the below model specification to examine the effect of ownership structure on the extent of rice-
leading-eamings. The regression specification is as follows: 
Rit = Co + C1Eit-1 + C2Eit + C3E3it + C4R3it + C5OWNit + C6OWNit * Eit-1  
+ C7OWNit*Eit+C8OWNit*E3it+C9OWNit*R3it+(Fixed effects) + Uit      (4) 
Where all the variables are defined as above. The hypothesis of this study predicts that price-leading-
eamings effect increases with the degree of divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights. Therefore, the 
coefficient on the interaction between future earnings (E3it) and OWNit is expected to be positive. Equation (4) 
also investigates whether the divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights reduces the ability of current 
earnings to explain current returns. A negative coefficient on OWNit and current earnings (Eit) would be 
consistent with results of Fan and Wong (2002), after price-leading-eamings effect is controlled for. 
 
4. Regression results 
In this section, we use Equation (1) –Equation (4) to test the hypothesis that the ownership structure affects the 
extent to which the price incorporates the future earnings. 
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Table 5. Ownership structure and informativeness of current earnings 
Independent Equation(1)   Equation (2) 
Intercept 0.088**   0.066* 
  (2.373)   (1.733) 
Eit-1 -0.839***     
  (-3.966)     
Eit 2.700***   2.571*** 
  (13.635)   (12.332) 
OWNit     0.012 
      (1.068) 
OWNit*Eit     -0.989*** 
      (-2.633) 
Fixed Effects       
HongKong 0.077*   0.056 
  (1.732)   (1.224) 
Indonesia 0.132*   0.128* 
  (1.931)   (1.864) 
Japan -0.077**   -0.063* 
  (-2.079)   (-1.689) 
South Korea 0.065   0.063 
  (1.610)   (1.556) 
Malaysia 0.177***   0.179*** 
  (3.800)   (3.809) 
Philippines 0.175*   0.169* 
  (1.704)   (1.652) 
Singapore 0.112***   0.121*** 
  (2.621)   (2.782) 
Thailand 0.001   -0.008 
  (0.020)   (-0.114) 
1990 -0.403***   -0.407*** 
  (-23.835)   (-24.133) 
1991 -0.197***   -0.200*** 
  (-18.044)   (-18.181) 
1992 -0.273***   -0.280*** 
  (-24.988)   (-25.473) 
1993 0.047***   0.038*** 
  (3.477)   (2.832) 
Adjusted R2 0.332   0.330 
F-value 196.68   182.14 
(P-value) (<0.0001)   (<0.0001) 
This table presents the regression results of current returns on current earnings and interaction with ownership 
structure for the sample with 5,519 firm-year observations. White-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. *,**, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
Table 5 provides regression estimates for contemporaneous price-earnings relations. Throughout the 
study, we report White-adjusted t-statistics for all coefficients. The First column reports the results of equation 
(1), which examines the contemporaneous association between stock returns and accounting earnings. The 
estimated coefficient of current earnings (Eit) is significantly positive, suggesting current earnings are 
informative in East Asian economies. The second column are the results for equation (2), which replicates Fan 
and Wong's (2002) study on the impacts of ownership structure on the informativeness of contemporaneous 
earnings with respect to stock returns. The coefficient on the interaction term between the divergence between 
cash flow rights and voting rights and current earnings [OWNit*Eit] is significantly negative, suggesting higher 
level of divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights reduces the informativeness of current earnings. 
This is consistent with the evidence provided by Fan and Wong (2002). 
Fan and Wong (2002) use CV, i.e., cash flows rights/voting rights, which is inversely related to cash-
voting rights divergence, to investigate the effect of separation of cash flow rights from voting rights on the 
informativeness of earnings. They report a significantly positive coefficient on [CV*Eit]. Therefore, our study 
successfully replicates Fan and Wong's results, although the sample used in this study is different from theirs. 
Fan and Wong's (2002) sample includes 3752 firm-year observations, spanning between 1991 and 1995 and 
coving 977 firms from Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
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Table 6. Ownership structure and price-lead-earnings 
Variable Equation (3)   Equation (4) 
Intercept 0.045   0.037 
  (1.291)   (1.072) 
Eit-1 -0.891***   -0.793*** 
  (-4.150)   (-2.607) 
Eit 1.533***   1.954*** 
  (7.290)   (6.270) 
E3it 0.642***   0.543*** 
  (12.032)   (8.157) 
R3it -0.111***   -0.094*** 
  (-9.809)   (-6.720) 
OWNit     0.006 
      (0.430) 
OWNit*Eit-1     -0.415 
      (-0.765) 
OWNit*Eit     -1.474*** 
      (-2.771) 
OWNit*E3it     0.416*** 
      (2.746) 
OWNit*R3it     -0.071** 
      (-2.383) 
Fixed Effects       
HongKong 0.011   0.003 
  (0.248)   (0.060) 
Indonesia 0.050   0.043 
  (0.789)   (0.685) 
Japan -0.063*   -0.059* 
  (-1.850)   (-1.733) 
South Korea 0.064*   0.060 
  (1.677)   (1.576) 
Malaysia 0.171***   0.169*** 
  (3.837)   (3.801) 
Philippines 0.099   0.099 
  (0.999)   (1.019) 
Singapore 0.105***   0.107*** 
  (2.607)   (2.646) 
Thailand -0.082   -0.082 
  (-1.317)   (-1.332) 
1990 -0.334***   -0.333*** 
  (-18.816)   (-18.956) 
1991 -0.174***   -0.173*** 
  (16.219)   (-16.171) 
1992 -0.244***   -0.241*** 
  (-22.903)   (-22.744) 
1993 0.072***   0.076*** 
  (5.367)   (5.656) 
F-value     6.20 
      (<0.0001) 
Adjusted R2 0.383   0.386 
F-value 215.00   166.06 
(P-value) (<0.0001)   (<0.0001) 
This table presents the regression results of current returns on aggregated current future earnings and interaction 
with ownership structure for the sample with 5,519 firm-year observations. White-adjusted t-statistics are in 
parentheses. *,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Table 6 presents evidence on price-leading-earnings effect and how ownership structure affects the 
extent to which prices lead earnings. The first column presents results for equation (3), where current returns are 
regressed on current earnings (Eit) and future earnings (E3it). This equation serves as a benchmark model for 
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equation (4), which examines the impacts of ownership structure on price-leading-eamings effect. Consistent 
with prior research on price-leading-earnings effect, the coefficient on future earnings (E3it) is significantly 
positive in equation (3), suggesting that future earnings news is impounded into current returns. And the 
significantly negative coefficient on future returns (R3it) indicates that proxying expected future earnings by 
realized future earnings contains measurement errors and part of such errors are removed by future returns. 
Overall, the results for equation (3) are consistent with Collins et al. (1994), suggesting that current stock returns 
incorporate future earnings information in East Asian economies. 
The second column in Table 6 reports the extent to which ownership structure affects the price-leading-
eamings in East Asian economies. The coefficients on both current earnings (Eit) and future earnings (E3it) are 
significantly positive, suggesting current stock returns reflect information in both current and future earnings. 
And the coefficient on the interaction between current earnings and the divergence between cash flow rights and 
voting rights [OWNit * Eit] is significantly negative. Therefore, as Fan and Wong (2002) argue, the divergence 
between cash flow rights and voting rights lowers the informativeness of current earnings with respect to current 
returns. However, the coefficient on the interaction between the divergence measure and future earnings [OWNit 
* E3it] is significantly positive (p<0.01), suggesting that stock prices of firms with greater divergence between 
cash flow rights and voting rights incorporate future earnings earlier than those of firm with smaller such 
divergence. Therefore, the results in Table 5 support the hypothesis of this study. 
The adjusted R2 increases slightly from 38.3% in equation (3) to 38.6% in equation (4). Therefore, the 
ownership structure variable provides little incremental explanatory power to the price-leading-earnings model 
[i.e., equation (3)]. However, the F-test for the joint significance of OWN, OWN*Eit-1, OWN*E3it, and 
OWN*R3it has a p-value of 0.0001. This suggests that ownership structure does add explanatory power to the 
variations in current stock returns. 
 
5. Additional tests 
5.1 Controlling for firm-specific factors 
Prior research has documented that the magnitude of earnings response coefficient is related to several factors 
such as past growth, firm size, and the presence of losses. Since these firm-specific characteristics could be 
correlated with the ownership structure measure, the effect of ownership structure on the informativeness of 
current and future earnings with respect to stock returns could result from correlated but omitted variable 
problems. For instance, size is an important conditioning variable to test the information content of future 
earnings with respect to stock returns (Collins, Kothari, and Raybum, 1987; Freeman, 1987; Ayers and Freeman, 
2000). To examine whether the omission of these characteristics variables has biased the coefficients on 
variables of interest, we include both the main effect of each characteristics variables and the interaction term 
between these characteristics variables and the variables of interest in the following regression: 
Rit =C0+C1Eit-1+ C2Eit + C3E3it + C4R3it + C5OWNit + C6OWNit*Eit-1 
+C7OWNit *Eit + C8OWNit*E3it + C9OWNit*R3it+C10CONTROL 
+C11CONTROL*Eit-1+C12CONTROL*Eit+C13C0NTROL*E3it 
+C14CONTROL*R3it+(Fixedeffects)+Uit                                                   (5) 
Where, CONTORL is the firm characteristic variables. They are defined as: 
Loss = an indicator variable that is set equal to 1 when net income is negative and zero otherwise, 
Growth = the percentage growth in the firm's total assets from year t-1 to year t, 
Size = the natural log of market value of equity at the end of year t-1, and 
Sign of Rit = an indicator variable that is set equal to 1 when current returns are negative and zero otherwise. And 
all other variables are defined as above. 
The control of loss is motivated by Hyan's (1995) finding that earnings response coefficient is close to 
zero when firms report losses. And Collins and Kothari (1989) report that high-growth firms tend to have higher 
earnings response coefficient. While there is no reliable theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting that firm 
size is related to the magnitude of earnings response coefficient, firm size could be correlated with other firm 
characteristics. Therefore, we also control for firm size in the above regression. In addtion, Basu (1997) shows 
that, under the conservatism principle, accounting earnings reflect bad news much faster than good news, where 
good and bad news are proxied by the sign of the stock returns. To take the impacts of conservatism into account, 
we also include the dummy variable indicating negative stock returns in the above regression model. 
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Table 7. Ownership structure and price-lead-earnings: adding interaction control 
  Loss Growth Size Sign of Rit 
Intercept -0.006 0.051 -0.412*** 0.208*** 
  (-0.176) (1.457) (-6.456) (7.829) 
Eit-1 -1.030*** -0.991*** 0.736 -1.137*** 
  (-3.083) (-3.159) (0.485) (-3.414) 
Eit 3.054*** 1.995*** 1.661 1.499*** 
  (8.918) (6.123) (0.924) (4.213) 
E3it 0.507*** 0.492*** -0.100 0.519*** 
  (7.873) (7.247) (-0.278) (7.225) 
R3it -0.092*** -0.091*** 0.179** -0.131*** 
  (-6.667) (-5.905 (2.459) (-7.999) 
OWNit -0.009 0.003 0.018 0.002 
  (-0.688) (0.256) (1.307) (0.242) 
OWNit*Eit-1 -0.495 -0.438 -0.561 0.031 
  (-0.869) (-0.813) (-1.044) (0.073) 
OWNit*Eit -0.783 -1.374*** -1.395*** -0.708* 
  (-1.389) (-2.553) (-2.625) (-1.783) 
OWNit*E3it 0.415*** 0.400*** 0.397*** 0.251** 
  (2.633) (2.696) (2.705) (1.978) 
OWNit*R3it -0.069** -0.076** -0.054* -0.024 
  (-2.298) (-2.566) (-1.847) (-1.087) 
Control 0.035** -0.088** 0.026*** -0.371*** 
  (2.069) (-2.432) (8.347) (-38.272) 
Control*Eit-1 0.868** 1.808** -0.087 0.901*** 
  (2.090) (2.181) (-0.951) (2.845) 
Control*Eit -2.949*** -0.492 0.012 -1.029*** 
  (-6.202) (-0.746) (0.109) (-3.170) 
Control*E3it -0.110 0.223*** 0.039* -0.467*** 
  (-0.716) (2.871) (1.817) (-6.494) 
Control*R3it -0.048 -0.003 -0.017*** 0.100*** 
  (-1.091) (-0.106) (-3.913) (6.200) 
Fixed Effects         
Hong Kong -0.048 -0.001 0.075* -0.004 
  (-1.091) (-0.031) (1.653) (-0.112) 
Indonesia 0.012 0.043 -0.027 0.052 
  (0.192) (0.686) (-0.449) (1.070) 
Japan -0.049 -0.060* -0.092*** -0.046* 
  (-1.439) (-1.746) (-2.753) (-1.819) 
South Korea 0.036 0.058 -0.003 0.014 
  (0.967) (1.520) (-0.089) (0.500) 
Malaysia 0.162*** 0.170*** 0.251*** 0.147*** 
  (3.698) (3.812) (5.503) (4.296) 
Philippines 0.087 0.099 0.145 0.122 
  (0.911) (1.009) (1.516) (2.528 
Singapore 0.093** 0.109*** 0.209*** 0.052* 
  (2.348) (2.702) (5.072) (1.685) 
Thailand -0.104* -0.081 -0.031 -0.008 
  (-1.720) (-1.308) (-0.529) (-0.171) 
1990 -0.318*** -0.331*** -0.341*** -0.127*** 
  (-17.902) (-18.817) (-19.253) (-9.728) 
1991 -0.161*** -0.169*** -0.184*** -0.030*** 
  (-15.088) (-15.456) (-17.492) (-3.491) 
1992 -0.238*** -0.244*** -0.237*** -0.081*** 
  (-22.437) (-22.856) (-22.334) (-9.192) 
1993 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.082*** 0.087*** 
  (5.635) (5.591) (6.112) (8.075) 
Adjusted R2 0.400 0.389 0.399 0.623 
F-value 142.40 135.85 142.07 352.35 
(P-value) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
This table presents the regression results of current returns on aggregated current future earnings and interaction 
with ownership structure by adding additional control variables. White-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Results of the above regression are reported in Table 7, where each column presents results when one 
characteristic variable is controlled for. Across the columns, the coefficients on future earnings (E3it) and current 
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earrings (Eit) remain to be significantly positive. And when earnings or stock returns are negative, the association 
between current returns or current earnings is much weaker. This finding is consistent with Hyan (1995) and 
Basu (1997). Furthermore, the coefficients on future earnings are significantly affected by growth and firm size. 
Most important for this study is that the coefficients on [OWNit*Eit] and [OWNit*E3it] remain to be significantly 
negative and positive, respectively, after these characteristic variables are controlled for. Therefore, the main 
conclusion that stock returns of firms with higher level of divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights 
reflect future earnings earlier is not altered after loss, past growth, firm size, and the sign of stock returns are 
controlled for. 
 
5.2 Year-by-year tests 
We perform the main regression of this study by year in this section. This is motivated by two considerations. 
First, as mentioned above, there is inconsistency between ownership structure data and financial data due to the 
difficulty in collecting the ownership data. By-year regressions help to identify the direction of bias caused by 
the measurement error problem. Second, the overlap of the dependent variable, stock returns, among the 
observations could overstate the OLS t-values when there is cross-correlation among the regression residuals 
(Bernard, 1987). Therefore, I estimate the regression by year and infer the t-values by the time-series variations 
in the estimated yearly coefficients. Fama and MacBeth (1973) suggest that this approach is less biased in the 
presence of cross-correlated regression residuals. 
 
Table 8. Ownership structure and price-lead-earnings: by year regression 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Mean 
Intercept -0.489 -0.302 -0.21 0.292*** 0.039 -0.134 
  (-23.317) (-2.361) (-4.290) -3.23 -0.889 (-0.98) 
Eit-1 -0.033 0.308 -0.71 -1.449** -1.345*** -0.646* 
  (-0.052) -0.593 (-1.254) (-2.262) (-3.136) (-1.85) 
Eit 1.927*** 2.096*** 1.975*** 1.683*** 2.403*** 2.017*** 
  -4.512 -4.245 -2.799 -2.811 -5.392 -17.15 
E3it 0.082 0.310*** -0.312** 0.666*** 0.309*** 0.336*** 
  -0.882 -3.033 -2.108 -5.346 -2.592 -3.58 
R3it -0.051** -0.041** -0.042 -0.245*** -0.015 -0.079* 
  (-2.049) (-2.284) (-1.512) (-6.689) (-0.485) (-1.88) 
OWNit -0.071 -0.042 -0.007 -0.063** -0.022 -0.041*** 
  (-1.182) (-1.587) (-0.388) (-2.018) (-0.807) (-3.43) 
OWNit*Eit-1 0.377 -0.582 0.802 1.811 -0.724 0.337 
  -0.216 (-0.528) -1.023 -1.609 (-0.966) -0.72 
OWNit*Eit -1.363 0.886 -1.802* -2.110** -1.49 -1.176** 
  (-0.883) -0.662 (-1.800) (-2.036) (-1.838) (-2.21) 
OWNit*E3it 0.421 0.2 0.244 0.437 0.423 0.345*** 
  -0.685 -0.857 -0.944 -1.527 -1.645 -6.8 
OWNit*R3it -0.063 -0.066 -0.075 0.185*** -0.151** -0.034 
  (-0.712) (-1.475) (-1.362) -2.645 (-2.100) (-0.59) 
Fixed Effects             
Hong Kong 0.348 0.129 0.275 -0.008 -0.243 0.1 
  -0.187 -0.117 -0.078 -0.096 -0.067 -0.95 
Indonesia 0.165 -0.198 0.136 0.17 -0.401 -0.059 
  0.132 -0.158 -0.082 -0.103 -0.087 (-0.55) 
Japan 0.148 0.11 -0.073 -0.285 0.066 -0.007 
  -0.175 -0.112 -0.073 -0.09 -0.059 (-0.09) 
South Korea 0.206 0.058 0.213 -0.083 0.097 0.098* 
  -0.175 -0.115 -0.078 -0.095 -0.067 -1.81 
Malaysia 0.466 0.198 0.121 0.281 0.113 0.236*** 
  -0.182 -0.116 -0.079 -0.097 -0.066 -3.62 
Philippines 0.34 -0.158 0.375 0.434 -0.183 0.162 
  -0.214 -0.177 -0.108 -0.124 -0.087 -1.18 
Singapore 0.31 0.311 0.116 0.172 -0.094 0.163** 
  -0.179 -0.115 -0.077 -0.096 -0.067 -2.18 
Thailand 0.623 -0.333 0.174 -0.098 -0.318 -0.115 
  0.555 -0.134 -0.087 -0.104 -0.08 (-1.19) 
Obs. 197 1084 1308 1422 1508 5 
Adjusted R2 0.3702 0.3417 0.5081 0.5074 0.1581   
F-value 8.68 34.06 80.41 87.10 17.64   
(P-value) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)   
This table presents the regression results of current returns on aggregated current future earnings and interaction 
with ownership structure across year. White-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Table 8 reports the by-year regression results as well as the t-values computed by Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
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approach. There are two major findings. First, the coefficients on and the t-values of [OWNit*Eit] and 
[OWNit*E3it] are larger in magnitude for the second half of the sample period. Since the ownership structure 
data used is close to the last year of the sample period, this pattern suggests that the effect of ownership structure 
on informativeness of current earnings and price-leading-eamings phenomenon could be even stronger if there is 
no measure error in the ownership data. Second, the Fama-MacBeth t-values for [OWNit*Eit] and [OWNit*E3it] 
are significant at 5% or better level and their signs remain to be negative and positive, respectively. Therefore, 
the results reported in prior section are robust to the control of cross-sectional correlations of the regression 
residuals. 
 
5.3 Exclusion of observations from Japan 
Table 9. Ownership structure, earnings informativeness, and price-leading-earnings for subsample without Japan 
Variables Equation(1) Equation (2) Equation (3) Equation (4) 
Intercept -0.106** -0.130*** -0.129*** -0.131*** 
  (-2.554) (-2.960) (-3.142) (-3.022) 
Eit-1 -0.497   -0.398 -0.596 
  (-1.530)   (-1.263) (-1.560) 
Eit 3.065*** 2.963*** 2.231*** 2.657*** 
  (10.827) (10.098) (7.397) (6.607) 
E3it     0.374*** 0.294*** 
      (6.617) (4.147) 
R3it     -0.107*** -0.093*** 
      (-6.197) (-4.506) 
OWNit   0.079   -0.005 
    (1.052)   (-0.073) 
OWNit*Eit-1       1.467 
        (1.128) 
OWNit*Eit   -0.669   -2.622** 
    (-0.806)   (-2.196) 
OWNit*E3it       0.524*** 
        (2.187) 
OWNit*R3it       -0.089 
        (-1.574) 
Fixed Effects         
Hong Kong 0.005 -0.003 -0.022 -0.024 
  (0.100) (-0.057) (-0.458) (-0.497) 
Indonesia 0.085 0.078 0.036 0.019 
  (1.235) (1.142) (0.559) (0.297) 
South Korea 0.057 0.060 0.055 0.054 
  (1.311) (1.377) (1.280) (1.251) 
Malaysia 0.236*** 0.240*** 0.254*** 0.254*** 
  (4.360) (4.440) (4.723) (4.741) 
Philippines 0.314*** 0.312*** 0.265*** 0.262*** 
  (3.012) (2.992) (2.584) (2.584) 
Singapore 0.105** 0.103** 0.102** 0.100** 
  (2.313) (2.225) (2.296) (2.237) 
Thailand -0.084 -0.081 -0.122** -0.119** 
  (-1.432) (-1.378) (-2.067) (-2.035) 
1990 -0.267*** -0.271*** -0.163*** -0.161*** 
  (-9.806) (-10.036) (-4.821) (-4.822 
1991 -0.094*** -0.100*** -0.033 -0.033 
  (-3.172) (-3.438) (-0.990) (-1.008) 
1992 -0.028 -0.033 0.003 0.006 
  (0.917) (-1.116) (0.104) (0.176) 
1993 0.514*** 0.509*** 0.503*** 0.503*** 
  (13.932) (13.835) (13.834) (13.874) 
Adjusted R2 0.308 0.307 0.341 0.343 
p_value 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
This table presents the regression results of current returns on aggregated current future earnings and interaction 
with ownership structure for subsample without firms in Japan. White-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
As shown in Table 3, Japanese observations represent a large portion of the full samples (about 70%) and 
ownership structure of Japanese firms is different from that of other eight economies. To ensure that the main 
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results are not driven by Japanese firms, we also estimate the regressions by a subsample that excludes 
observations from Japan. There are 1787 observations in this subsample. The main results are reported in table 9. 
Most of the results confirm those from the full sample except that the interaction between ownership structure 
and informativeness of current earnings appear to be sensitive to the exclusion of Japanese firms when future 
earnings are not included in the regression model (Column 2). For the full model reported in the last column, the 
coefficient on [OWNit*E3it] is still significantly positive and that on [OWNit*Eit] still is significantly negative. 
Therefore, the main results of this paper are robust to the exclusion of Japanese firms. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study hypothesizes that price-leading-earnings effect increases with the level of divergence between cash 
flow rights and voting rights, which is prevalent in East Asian economies. The explanation for this is controlling 
owners' private information incentives. Controlling shareholders have both incentives and capacity to access 
private information from corporate managers. And the divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights 
heightens such incentives. Consequently, stock prices of firms that are controlled by these shareholders capture 
information in accounting earnings sooner than the disclosure of financial statements compared to stock prices of 
firms without such dominant controlling shareholders in place. 
Empirical results show that ownership structure has an important and significant impact on the 
association between stock returns and current as well as future earnings. Stock prices of firms with greater 
divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights incorporate future earnings earlier than stock prices of 
firms with smaller such divergence. At the same time, the results suggest that informativeness of current 
earnings decreases with the level of divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights, which is consistent 
with Fan and Wong's (2002) findings. These results are robust to controls of firm size, growth, loss, and the sign 
of stock returns. Prior studies have shown (e.g., Ball et al., 2000; Fan and Wong, 2002) that earnings reported by 
corporations in East Asian economies are of low quality, which is possibly resulted from the underlying 
economic and political factors influencing controlling owners' incentives. However, these studies focus on the 
contemporaneous association stock returns and accounting earnings. In contrast, this study documents that there 
is a positive effect of the divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights on price-leading-eamings in the 
East Asian economies. Given that price-leading-eamings effect is one aspect of market efficiency, this study has 
implications for the assessment of earnings quality as well as how corporate governance structure affects 
earnings quality. 
Since it is important issue of how investors perceive the earning information and incorporate them into 
stock price, future research would deeply investigate the other important determinant factors, at firm level, 
industry level, and institution level, that underlie the stock price efficiency. 
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Notes 
Note 1. But different from the other East Asian firms that are typically family controlled, the dominant ultimate 
owners of Japanese firms are institutions, typically the main banks of industrial groups. Japanese firms' 
ownership structures are also different from those of the other East Asian firms in the degree of cash flow rights 
and voting rights divergence. This is one reason we need to perform the additional analyses for subsample 
without Japanese observations in Table 9. 
Note 2. It is also an important contributing factor to the weak contemporaneous price-earning associations. 
Note 3. Rajgopal et al. (2002) is the first study to demonstrate that stock prices reflect relatively more 
information about future earnings relative to current earnings as the percentage of institutional investors’ 
shareholdings increases. 
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